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PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IN THE
PROJECT RULISON CASE*
[Persuading courts to transform into remedies academic theories
for legal protection of the environment is ultimately the task of the
practicing attorney: "The problems facing this lawyer can be formidable. The law may be a new, unfamiliar and technical statute. Again,
it may be a vast collection of miscellaneous, unfamiliar precedents.
Worst of all it may be non-existent .... -"
The Project Rulison2 brief deals with certain threshold issues encountered in environmental law practice. It is not an attempt at a
balanced, scholarly consideration of the issues. It is rather the effort
of the attorney responsible for winning or losing at the trial level.
Although the Project Rulison case was by no means an unmitigated
victory for plaintiffs,8 the brief may still be counted an outstanding
success: for the first time, the Atomic Energy Commission was forced
to stand trial on the issue of radiation safety standards, a matter traditionally considered within its exclusive discretion:
The first, and perhaps the greatest hurdle in a suit with the
federal government is the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
* The following brief was prepared under the direction of Mr. Victor John Yannacone, Jr., of Patchogue, New York, a member of the Environmental Law Section of
the American Trial Lawyers Association. On the brief with Mr. Yannacone, as research assistant, was Mr. Stephen G. Davison of Yale Law School.
1 Moorman, Outline for the Practicing Environmental Lawyer 2, presented to the Conference on Law and the Environment, Sept. 11-12, 1969, in Warrenton, Virginia.
2 Project Rulison is a joint experiment sponsored by the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), the Department of Interior and Austral Oil Company, Inc.
(Austral). The program manager is CER Geonudear Corporation (CER). Rulison
is a part of the Plowshare Program of the AEC, which is designed to develop
peaceful use of nuclear explosive technology. The specific purpose of the project
is to study the economic and technical feasibility of nuclear stimulation of the
low permeability gas bearing Mesaverde sandstone formation in the Rulison
Field of Colorado. "Nuclear stimulation" is the detonation of a nuclear device
in the formation which will create a cavity and attendant fracture system that
will stimulate the production of natural gas from the formation. The Mesaverde
formation, because of its low permeability, does not produce natural gas in
commercial quantities, although it does contain a significant gas reserve.
Crowther v. Seaborg, Civil No. C-1712 (D. Colo., March 16, 1970), at S.
S The original action to enjoin Project Rulison, brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), was summarily dismissed by the district court. Following the
dismissal, a second action was brought on behalf of the Colorado Open Spaces Coordinating Council (COSC). Although the court refused to enjoin the nuclear blast, a
preliminary restraining order was entered prohibiting the release of the radioactive
gases trapped underground following the blast. The ACLU action was then revived
and consolidated with the COSC action. Ultimately, however, the district court allowed
the release of the gas. Crowther v. Seaborg, Civil No. C-1712 (D. Colo., March 16, 1970).
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Because the government puts so much of its litigation effort into
such motions, he who defeats one may consider himself to have won
a major victory. In fact, establishing the right of the citizen to sue
to protect the environment by defeating such motions is of the
first priority. Precedents in the field are trophies to be sought
after 4
The Editors.]
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
DISTRICT OF COLORADO
COLORADO OPEN SPACE COORDINATING COUNCIL, on
behalf of all those entitled to the protection of their health and safety
and of the health and safety of those generations yet unborn, from
the hazards of ionizing radiation resulting from the distribution of
radioactive materials through the permanent biogeochemical cycles of
the biosphere as a result of the defendants' conduct of Project Rulison,
and on behalf of all those entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the national natural resource treasures of the State of Colorado
without degradation resulting from contamination with radioactive
material released as a result of the defendants' conduct of Project
Rulison, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

-againstAUSTRAL OIL COMPANY, INCORPORATED
and
CER GEONUCLEAR CORPORATION,
Defendants
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, and
LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY,
as theirseveral interests may appear.
4 Moorman, supra note 1, at 9. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Court indicates by way of dicta that it looks favorably

upon the trend towards judicial protection of environmental interests:
[T]he Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person "aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed.,
Supp. IV). That interest, at times, may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational" as well as economic values. Scenic Hudson PreservationConf. v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 616; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
. . . 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06. . . . We mention these noneconomic values to

emphasize that standing may stem from them as well as from the economic
injury on which petitioner relies here.
Id. at 153-54.
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POINT 1
Actions of the Atomic Energy Commission are subject to judicial
review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Atomic Energy Commission was established under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 2, 60 Stat. 756 (1946), as amended 42
U.S.C. § 2031 (1964). The original bill provided for "Government control over atomic energy and for Government programs of information,
production, research, and development." S. REP.No. 1211, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1946). The Atomic Energy Commission was to be "responsible for administering domestic controls over atomic energy, for carrying on production, research and.., development." Id. at 11. There
was to be "an absolute Government monopoly of production of fissionable materials," and the Commission was to be "the exclusive producer
of atomic weapons." Id. at 14, 19. However, the private sector, under
supervision of the Commission, was to be allowed to participate in
industrial research in the field of atomic energy, and in the ownership,
mining, and refining of source materials from which fissionable materials
are produced. Id. at 15, 18. The Commission was empowered to license
the manufacture and use of atomic energy devices, but only after the
prior approval of Congress, since "devices utilizing atomic energy, if
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widely used, would so multiply potential hazards to national health and
safety that even careful Government regulation would fail to provide
adequate safeguards." Id. at 21. The Act, however, did "not permit
the Commission to license the use of devices which produce fissionable
material in the course of utilizing atomic energy." Id.
Section 12 (a) (2) of the 1946 Act gave the Commission the authority to "[e]stablish safety and health regulations for the possession and
use of fissionable and byproduct materials to minimize the danger
from explosion, radioactivity, and other harmful or toxic effects incident
to the presence of such materials." S. RIP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28 (1946).
Section 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 clearly provided for
judicial review of any agency action under the Act pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act:
SEc. 14. (a) [S]ection 10 of [the Administrative Procedure] Act
[presently codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1969)] (relating
to judicial review) shall be applicable, upon the enactment of this
Act, to any agency action under the authority of this Act ....

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), no provision of this
Act shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
(c) As used in this section the terms "agency action" and
"agency" shall have the same meaning as is assigned to such terms
in the Administrative Procedure Act.
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 14, 60 Stat. 772 (1946), as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1964).
This provision, which did not appear in the Senate version of
the bill, was recommended as an amendment to the Senate version
of the bill, S.1717, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), in the House report.
H.R. R P. No. 2478, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1946). The House report
stated that the proposed amendment
affirms the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
provides that it will apply to legislation subsequently enacted. It
is provided, however, that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, relating to judicial review, for the purposes of this legislation shall take effect immediately.
Id. at 13.
The conference report, which was accepted by both the Senate
and the House, adopted House amendment 41, stating:
This amendment provides that section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act should be applicable with respect to agency actions
of the Commission immediately upon the enactment of this act
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and provided that this act should not be held to supersede or
modify the Administrative Procedure Act.
92 CONG. REc. 10192 (1946).
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 clearly placed a strong emphasis
on the government's duty to protect the health and safety of the public.
Furthermore, the Act specifically provided judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act of all agency action by the Atomic Energy
Commission.
Section 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 772
(1946), relating to judicial review was amended by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964). The amendment to section 14
was originally proposed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
in the following form, to supplant section 14:
"SEc. 181. GENERA.-The provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act shall apply to 'agency action' of the Commission,
as that term is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. In
determining whether an act of the Commission would be an 'agency
action,' the fact that the national security and the common defense
require the act, or facts essential to that act to be kept secret shall
not be considered. For 'agency action' which can be made public,
the full regular administrative procedures shall be followed. For
'agency action' which cannot be undertaken in public, the Commission shall provide by regulation for identical procedures except
that they shall not be public. Upon application, the Commission
shall grant a hearing to any party materially interested in any
'agency action.'"
S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1954).
Though the House and Senate reports on the proposed amendment
to chapter 16, of which section 181 was a part, stated that "[t]his
chapter describes the procedures and conditions for issuing licenses
under the bill," the report further stated that
Section 181 makes the provisions of the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act applicable to all agency actions of the Commission.
Where publication of data involved in agency action is contrary
to the national security and common defense, then identical secret
procedures are required to be set up within the Commission. The
Commission is required to grant a hearing to any party materially
interested in any agency action.
S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181,

83d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954).
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was intended to permit the Coin-
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mission to license private industry to "possess and use special nuclear
material," "to own reactors intended to produce and utilize such
materials," and to participate in "atomic power development"; the
report also envisioned "teamwork between Government and industry,"
with the Act aimed "at encouraging flourishing research and development programs under both Government and private auspices." S. REP.
No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83 Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1954). The report indicated that "private participation in
power development need not bring with it attendant hazards to the
health and safety of the American people." S. REIP. No. 1699, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
Proposed amendments to section 182 set up procedures and safeguards for the issuance of licenses and construction permits by the
Commission to operate production and utilization facilities. S. REP.
No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-84 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 82-84 (1954). Section 189 proposed amendments dealt
with judicial review relating to licenses or construction permits.
"SEc. 189. JUDICIAL REviEw.--Any final order granting, denying, suspending, revoking, modifying, or rescinding any license or
construction permit, or application to transfer control, or any final
order issuing or modifying rules and regulations dealing with the
activities of licensees entered in any 'agency action' of the Commis-

sion shall be subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed
in the Act of December 29, 1950, as amended (ch. 1189, 64 Stat.
1129), and to the scope of judicial review and other remedies pro-

vided by section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act."
S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1954) (emphasis in original).
The House and Senate reports stated that "[s]ection 189 provides
for judicial review of a final order of the commission entered in certain
agency actions. The review is provided by the act establishing judicial
review for the actions of other regulatory agencies." S. REP. No. 1699,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
29 (1954).
During the debates on the bill in the Senate, Senator Anderson of
New Mexico showed concern that section 181 might be read so as to
deny the public the right to participation in the formation of non"licensing" contracts and arrangements between the Atomic Energy
Commission and private industry. (New Mexico's Senator Anderson, a
member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy addressed his remarks to Iowa's Senator Hickenlooper, Vice-Chairman of the Joint
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Committee on Atomic Energy and the sponsor of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 in the Senate:)
Mr. ANDERSON. [I]f I may pass on to section 102, it reads:
"Whenever the Commission has made a finding in writing that
any type of utilization or production facility has been sufficiently
developed to be of practical value for industrial or commercial
purposes, the Commission may thereafter issue licenses for such
type of facility pursuant to section 103."
The language of the provision sounded all right, and probably
is all right, but it does suggest that, once the Commission makes
its findings, it can issue licenses to produce nuclear power. What is
to stop the granting of dozens of licenses thereafter? The minimum
requirement should be that the Commission should hold hearings
and let the public know what the Commission plans to do.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I wonder whether the Senator from
New Mexico does not feel that sufficient protection is afforded in
section [182-b].
"b. The Commission shall not issue any license for a utilization or production facility for the generation of commercial power
under section 103, until it has given notice in writing to such
regulatory ,agency as may have jurisdiction over the rates and services of the proposed activity, and until it has published notice of
such application once each week for 4 consecutive weeks in the
Federal Register, and until 4 weeks after the last notice."
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I may say to the Senator
from Iowa that when in committee we discussed this language, I
thought it was sufficient. I still think it ought to be sufficient. But
I do not find myself able to tie the Administrative Procedure Act
to this requirement of the bill.
To return to section 181 and the portion on page 85 reading"Upon application, the Commission shall grant a hearing to
any party materially interested in any 'agency action "Let me say I think it is important to tell who may be interested, and therefore the widest publicity is necessary. For example,
if the Commission were going to grant a franchise to enable someone to establish a new plant inside the Chicago area, there might
be many persons who would be interested, but they would not
know that the matter was under consideration. I am trying to
say that the people who are interested will not be reached unless
they are given notice. I say again to the Senator from Iowa that
nothing in the section may need changing. I am merely stating that,
upon a second reading, some doubts arise, and I wonder what the
section actually provides.
100 CONG. REc. 10484-85 (1954).
Senator Anderson thus feared that the rights of the public to
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hearings and judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
might be held limited solely to the area of licensing.
Two days later, on July 16, 1954, Senator Hickenlooper, the
sponsor of the bill in the Senate, offered amendments to proposed sections 181 and 189.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the
Senator from Iowa will be stated.
The LEGIsLATIvE CLERKt. On page 91, line 4, it is proposed
to amend section 182 to read as follows:
"SEc. 189. Hearings and judicial review:

a. In any proceedings under this act, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceedings for
the issuance of modification of rules and regulations dealing with

the activities of licensees, and in any proceeding brought under
the provisions of section 152, and in any proceeding for the
payment of compensation, an award or royalties under section
156, 186(c) or 188, the Commission shall grant a hearing upon
the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the
proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such

proceeding.
b. Any final order entered in any proceeding of the kind
specified in subsection a. above entered in an 'agency action' of
the Commission shall be subject to judicial review in the manner
prescribed in the act of December 29, 1950, as amended (ch. 1189,
64 Stat. 1129), and to the provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended."
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, this section reincorporates the provisions for hearings formerly made part of section
181 but clearly specifies the types of Commission activities in which
a hearing is to be required. The purpose of this revision is to
specify clearly the circumstances in which hearings are to be held.
The section also reincorporates the former provisions of section
189 dealing with judicial review. There is a slight change in wording merely to clarify the intent of Congress with respect to the
extent of the applicability of the act of December 29, 1950, and
the applicability of the section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act.
I state that this is a procedural operation, and does not go
to the fundamentals of the so-called cross-patenting provision, or
any provision of that kind,
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. As a matter of fact, referring to the bill S.
3690, as reported by the committee, at page 84, under chapter 16,
"Judicial Review and Administrative Procedure," and extending
to page 85, in line 11, the bill refers to "agency action." That
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wording was thought to be too broad, broader than it was intended
to make it. The amendment limits the provision to hearings on
licenses in which a review shall take place.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. The Senator from Rhode Island is
correct. This is a corrective amendment which clarifies the situation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRIPPA in the chair). The
question is on agreeing to the amendement offered by the Senator
from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment 7-14-54-G.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will state the
amendment.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, if there is no objection, I ask that the amendment be not read. I shall give a short
explanation of the intent of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be printed in the REcORD at this point.
The amendment offered by Mr. HicKENLOOPER is as follows:
On page 84, amend § 181 to read as follows:
"SEc. 181. General: The provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (Public Law 404, 79th Cong., approved June 11,
1946) shall apply to all agency action taken under this act, and
the terms 'agency' and 'agency action' shall have the meaning
specified in the Administrative Procedure Act: Provided, however,
That in the case of agency proceedings or actions which involve
restricted data or defense information, the Commission shall provide by regulation for such parallel procedures as will effectively
safeguard and prevent disclosure of restricted data or defense information to unauthorized persons with minimum impairment
of the procedural rights which would be available if restricted
data or defense information were not involved."
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, the change in section
181 relating to the Administrative Procedure Act is to provide the
Commission with a little more flexibility in dealing with procedures than was provided in this section in the bill. This proposal
requires the Commission, where restricted data and defense information are concerned, to establish parallel procedures to those
regularly employed. But the procedures are such as to protect
against the wrongful dissemination of restricted data and defense
information while at the same time preserving as many of the
normal procedures as is possible. The section in the bill required
the Commission to have identical but secret proceedings.
I move the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to
the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HicKNLOOPER].

The amendment was agreed to.
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REc. 10685-86 (1954).
The remarks by Senator Pastore, a member of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, in relation to the words "agency action," clearly
show that Senator Hickenlooper, the sponsor of the bill in the Senate
and the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and
Senator Pastore, also a member of the Joint Committee, understood
the term "agency action" to encompass more than "licensing." The
fact that revised amended section 189 refers specifically to judicial
review of licensing proceedings, particularly under the Administrative
Procedure Act, does not raise a presumption either for or against
judicial review of other types of agency action. The revised amended
section 181, referring as it does to "all agency action," and in light of
the understanding of the sponsors of the bill as to the broad scope of
the term "agency action," clearly indicates that the Administrative Procedure Act is intended to apply to all and any actions by the Atomic
Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act. There is no basis
for finding that judicial review is confined to licensing proceedings, for
that would read out of revised amended section 181 the section of the
Administrative Procedure Act dealing with the right of judicial review.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV, 1969). Neither is there any legislative history
to support a holding that all of the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, except section 702, apply to all agency action by the
Atomic Energy Commission, but that section 702 was to apply only to
licensing. To so hold would not be a "'hospitable' interpretation" of
the Administrative Procedure Act or of 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1964);
neither would it be a holding based upon a clear and convincing legislative intent to deny judicial review as required by the holding in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Such a holding
would be contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act: "[Any
s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify... chapter 7 ... except to the extent that it does so expressly." 5 U.S.C. § 559
(Supp. IV, 1969).
Later remarks by Senator Hickenlooper indicate that the full
protection of the Administrative Procedure Act is to extend to the
public as far as the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission:
CONG.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, in response to the
suggestions made by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY],
I wish to state that, in all my experience during the past 10 years,
I have never observed a bill which protects as well as this bill
does those who are interested in obtaining licenses. The most profound and exhaustive protection is provided. So the Senator from
Minnesota need not have any fear whatsoever that the bill will fore-
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dose the rights of anyone, either in connection with hearings or
in any other connection. That subject was treated with meticulous
care by the committee. I do not mean to discuss it now; I do not
wish to trespass on the time of the Senator from Alabama, who now
has the floor.
However, I can not permit the insertion in the REcoRD, without contradiction by me, of statements that the bill will foreclose
anyone in connection with any rights in respect to licensing or in
respect to any other matters dealt with or affected by the various
provisions of the bill. Under the bill there will be the fullest rights
in connection with the hearings, under the Administrative Procedure Act and under the functioning of the Commission.
100 CONG. REc. 10731 (1954).
These statements by Senator Hickenlooper, the sponsor of the
amendment that is now 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1964), raise a strong presumption in favor of the right of judicial review by members of the public
of agency action similar to that in question.
In addition to the above statement by Senator Hickenlooper and
the emphasis by the House and Senate report upon the public health
and safety, numerous Senators stated, throughout the debates on the
bill, that Congress should be careful in protecting the taxpayers' $12
billion investment in atomic energy from being given away to private
industry. This comment of Senator Anderson is typical of the concern
for the public interest underlying the debate on the 1954 amendments
to the Atomic Energy Act:
It seems to me that in dealing with a matter in which the
people of the United States have already invested $12 billion, and
which can easily change the course of industrial history in the
entire Na'tion in a very few years, it might be worthwhile for the
Senate to spend a little bit of time upon the bill.
100 CONG. RF-c. 10376 (1954). See also id. at 10483 (remarks of Senator
Anderson); id. at 10555 (remarks of Senator Pastore); id. at 11591 (remarks of Senator Kerr); id. at 11781, 11782 (remarks of Senators
Humphrey and Sparkman); id. at 11786 (remarks of Senator Sparkman); id. at 11908 (remarks of Senator Lehman); id. at 11950 (remarks
of Senator Mansfield); id. at 12171 (remarks of Senator Morse).
Representative Cole of New York, the Chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and a sponsor of the bill in the House
of Representatives, introduced revised amended section 181, the same
as introduced in the Senate by Senator Hickenlooper, as a "committee
amendment." Id. at 11746-47. The amendment was accepted by the
House. Id. at 11747. The conference report, which adopted revised
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amended section 181, was accepted by the House and the Senate
without debate on section 181. Id. at 14603, 14606, 14863.
There is no clear and convincing legislative intent that judicial
review of agency action by the Atomic Energy Commission was to be
limited to licensing. The legislative history of 5 U.S.C. § 2231 (1964),
even when viewed most favorably to the defendants, is at best ambiguous. There was no debate as to the revised amended section 181, and
Senator Hickenlooper's remarks at 100 CONG. REc. 10731 (1954) support the presumption that the plaintiffs have a fundamental right to
judicial review of the actions of the Atomic Energy Commission here
in question.
POINT 2
The plaintiffs have sufficient standing to sue under the Adminis.
trative Procedure Act.
Plaintiff Richard T. Crowther
Plaintiff Crowther, as a property owner who would sustain property
damage from the unsafe release of radioactive material into the atmosphere and as a human being whose body would suffer damage from
exposure to ionizing radiation is a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action," and "is entitled to judicial review thereof."
"Legal wrong," as the term is used in 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV,
1969), "is the invasion of a legally protected right." Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
Plaintiff Crowther would certainly suffer a legal wrong if his property or body was contaminated by radioactive materials.
Plaintiff Crowther is a person "adversely affected or aggrieved"
within the meaning of a "relevant statute," the Atomic Energy Act,
because the statute is designed to protect his health and safety (42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012(d), 2012(e), 2012(i), 2013(d), 2051(d) (1964); see legislative
history, supra), and he has alleged that that interest in health and safety
is not being adequately protected.
"[A]ny person attempting to assert an interest, personal to him,
which the 'relevant statute' was specifically designed to protect, and
which he claims is not being protected, [is] 'adversely affected or aggrieved' within the meaning of that statute." Norwalk Core v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 933 n.26 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Plaintiff Colorado Open Space

Coordinating Council, Inc. (COSC)
Plaintiff COSC, as a non-profit, public service corporation whose
purposes include the preservation of the environment and protection
of human beings from pollution, is a person "adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act and Administrative Procedure Act. Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington,
887 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 921 (1968); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 884 U.S. 941 (1966); Sierra Club v. Volpe, - F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1969); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302
F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v.
HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Road Review League, Town
of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); International
Chem. Workers v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss.
1966). The court in InternationalChemical Workers stated:
[R]ecent court decisions have recognized the standing of
group plaintiffs as a "person aggrieved" where the group, qua
group, has an interest in the outcome of the administrative agency's
determination although it might, incidentally, represent broader
community interests as well.
259 F. Supp. at 867.
A non-profit, civic organization representing citizens who were to
be displaced by a proposed urban redevelopment project had standing
as "persons aggrieved" under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek
judicial review of agency action allegedly disregarding these citizens'
interests, though the "relevant statute," the National Housing Act, did
not specifically provide for judicial review. The court stated that
neither economic injury nor a specific individual legal right are necessary adjuncts to standing. A plaintiff need only demonstrate that
he is an appropriate person to question the agency's alleged failure
to protect a value specifically recognized by federal law as "in the
public interest"; he may then invoke judicial scrutinization of the
agency's performance in protecting-or in failing to protectthat specific value. He has standing to ask whether the agency
action is violative of the public interest.
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702) entitled
a person who is "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute" to obtain judicial review of that action. ...
[A] party must be considered "aggrieved" if, by his conduct and
activities, he has demonstrated "special interest" in the values
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recognized and protected by the relevant statute.... The plaintiff
...

[a]ssociation is certainly an adequate and appropriate repre-

sentative of those citizens' interests. If the public interest in these
values is to be protected, the voices of those most dramatically
affected by disregard of the values must be heard. If the residents
in the project site have no standing to raise these issues "inthe
public interest," then, for all practical purposes, no one has standing, and the Secretary's determinations would be virtually immune
from judicial review.... [S]uch result would neither be consistent
with the presumption of judicial review by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, nor specifically authorized by the
National Housing Act.
The court concluded that
the provisions of the National Housing Act recognizing and protecting the values of rehabilitation, relocation and integrated local
planning manifest a congressional intent that non-profit civic organizations representing the citizens who will be displaced by the
proposed project are to be considered "aggrieved" by agency action allegedly disregarding their interests.
Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 826-27,
828 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee case, held that an unincorporated civic
association had standing in a suit against state officials to enjoin construction of an interstate highway where jurisdiction was invoked under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343(3) (1964), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
2000(d) (1964).
In Scenic Hudson, an unincorporated association, consisting of a
number of non-profit, conservationist organizations, was held to have
standing as an "aggrieved party," within the meaning of section 313(b)
of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825(l)(b) (1964), which provides
that "[a]ny party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an
order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a
review of such order .

. . ."

The action was brought to set aside an

FPC order licensing a hydroelectric project on the Hudson River on
the grounds that the Commission had failed to properly weigh environmental factors and had not compiled a record sufficient to support
its decision.
In issuing a license, the Federal Power Commission is given the
following guidelines:
§ 803. Conditions of license generally.
All licenses issued under sections 792, 793, 795-818, and 820823 of this title shall be on the following conditions:
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(a) [t]hat the project adopted . . . shall be such as in the
judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a compre-

hensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the
improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for
other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes ....
16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964).
In Scenic Hudson the court stated that the phrase "recreational
purposes"
undoubtedly encompasses the conservation of natural resources,
the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic
sites.... In licensing a project, it is the duty of the Federal Power
Commission properly to weigh each factor.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development, those who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in
such areas, must be held to be included in the class of "aggrieved"
parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives
petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.
Id. at 616.
In Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, a civic organization of Bedford residents and a non-profit association concerned with
community problems, primarily involving the location of highways,
were held to be "aggrieved" by agency action within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure Act in an action to enjoin the approval
of the route of a federally aided interstate highway by the Secretary of
Transportation.
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702) entitles a
person who is "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute," to obtain judicial review of that action. The
"relevant statute" in this instance is the Federal Highways Act....
A project, among other things, is "to conform to the particular
needs of each locality." (23 U.S.C. § 109(a)). See also 23 U.S.C.
§ 134. The Act declares it to be the national policy that "in carrying out the provisions of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum
effort to preserve Federal, State, and local government parklands
and historic sites and the beauty and historic value of such lands
and sites." (23 U.S.C. § 138). Regulations adopted by the Secretary
under the Act provide that:
"The conservation and development of natural resources, the
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advancement of economic and social values, and the promotion of
desirable land utilization, as well as the existing and potential highway traffic and other pertinent criteria are to be considered when
selecting highways to be added to a Federal-aid system . . . . 23
C.F.R. § 1.6(c)."
I have concluded that these provisions are sufficient, under the
principle of Scenic Hudson, to manifest a congressional intent
that towns, local civic organizations, and conservation groups are
to be considered "aggrieved" by agency action which allegedly has
disregarded their interests. I see no reason why the word "aggrieved"
should have a different meaning in the Administrative Procedure
Act from the meaning given to it under the Federal Power Act.
See 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 22.05 at 225 (1958). The "relevant statute," i.e., the Federal Highways Act contains language
which seems even stronger than that of the Federal Power Act, as
far as local and conservation interests are concerned. I appreciate
that, speaking strictly, Scenic Hudson can be distinguished from
the present case on the ground that Scenic Hudson involved an
appeal from an administrative decision in a proceeding to which
appellants were already parties, whereas here, plaintiffs have
brought an independent action. Plaintiffs were not previously
parties in a formal sense to any administrative proceeding, although
as a practical matter they participated actively in attempting to
secure an administrative determination favorable to their interest.
My decision here can be thought to involve an extension of the
Scenic Hudson doctrine. If so, it is an extension which I believe to
be warranted by the rationale of that decision.
Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650,
660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, an unincorporated association of citizens who resided in the area involved,
and the Sierra Club, a non-profit conservation corporation organized
in California with various chapters throughout the United States, were
held to have standing in a suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Army,
the Chief of the Corps of Engineers, and the Secretary of Transportation from issuing permits to the New York State Department of Transportation for the construction of causeways and dikes in conjunction
with the building of a state-financed highway.
The court held that the Administrative Procedure Act justified
the court's jurisdiction, even though there was "no separate statutory
authority which grants jurisdiction to the district courts to have a
decision of the Secretary of the Army reviewed."
The court stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has implemented what appears to be a
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presumption in favor of a finding of jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 . . . (1967), it was held that the courts should restrict
access to judicial review "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent . .. ." 587 U.S.
at 141 . . . , citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 . .. (1962). See also
Powelton Civic Home Own. Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809

(E.D. Pa. 1968).
A 1966 decision in this circuit held that the Administrative
Procedure Act constituted an affirmative grant of jurisdiction with
respect to the review of federal administrative actions. Cappadora
v. Celebrezze, 856 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966). Judge McLean in Road
Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), followed the reasoning of Cappadoraand referred
to the Administrative Procedure Act as a "jurisdictional statute."
270 F. Supp. at 659.
Since the presumption in favor of jurisdiction has not been
rebutted by a clear and convincing presentation of an opposite
legislative intent, we hold that this court has the necessary jurisdiction to rule on the dispute under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 802 F. Supp. 1083,
1090-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The court then held that all of the plaintiffs had standing necessary to maintain the action. "The standing problem becomes more
acute with the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee as they admittedly have no personal economic claim to assert. Rather they are
'aggrieved' by the alleged destruction of the natural resources of the
river." Id. at 1092.
The court then analyzed the Scenic Hudson case, noting that the
unincorporated association of non-profit conservation organizations in
Scenic Hudson, like the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee,
"had no direct economic interest in the controversy. Yet, they were
found to be 'aggrieved parties' because the Federal Power Act was held
to create a public interest in the scenic, historical, and recreational
values of the area."Id. The court also reviewed the Road Review case,
and concluded:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the
controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic,
and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give
standing to groups interested in these factors and who allege that
these factors are not being properly considered by the agency.
In the instant case the Department of Transportation Act
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manifests the same congressional concern. One of the regulations
under which the Corps of Engineers issued the permit, 33 C.F.R.
§ 209.330 [209, 120(d)(1)], calls for the consideration of the effects
of the permit on fish, recreation, pollution, and natural resources
as well as navigation.
Id. at 1092-93.
Public Law 89-605, 80 Stat. 847 (1966) states that the Hudson
River basin contains resources of "immense economic, natural,
scenic, historic and recreation value to all the citizens of the
United States ..
Id. at 1093 n.12.
Therefore, under the guidelines of Scenic Hudson and Road
Review both the Sierra Club and the Citizens Committee have the
requisite standing to maintain these actions.
Id. at 1093.
In Sierra Club v. Volpe, the Sierra Club, as a non-profit California
corporation, was held to have standing in an action for a preliminary
and permanent injunction against the Chief of the Forest Service and
the Secretary of Agriculture to enjoin the issuance of permits to a
private hotel-resort in a national forest-national game refuge, and
against the Secretary of the Interior and the Chief of the National Park
Service to enjoin the issuance of permits for a road and electrical
transmission line right-of-way through a national park to connect to
the resort area.
The court, after noting that the defendants had probably violated
their statutory authority in issuing the permits, stated:
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have no standing to sue
because they have nothing more than a general interest in common
with all citizens and cannot show that any private, substantive
legally protected interest of theirs is being directly invaded within
the meaning of such cases as Associated v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694
(2d Cir. 1943); Anti-Fascist v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41, 151-52
(1951); Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Associated v.
Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1969).
We are of the opinion, however, that plaintiff, Sierra Club,
a non-profit California corporation, organized and existing for the
purposes described in its complaint (Par. 3), may be held to be
sufficiently aggrieved to have standing as a plaintiff herein.
(N.D. Cal. 1969).
F. Supp. Sierra Club v. Volpe, The plaintiff is an organization interested in the protection of
natural and scenic resources and in the protection of human beings
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from injury from pollution. Radionuclides are certainly to be considered atmospheric pollutants and are inherently dangerous materials.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is a statute that encompasses
these areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2013, 2051(d) (1964). The legislative
history of those sections indicates that Congress "had the problem of
safety uppermost in mind" in the promulgation of the Atomic Energy
Act. Power Reactor Development Co. v. IUE, 867 U.S. 896, 414 (1961).
The protection of the health and safety envisioned by Congress is
protection from the hazards of radiation:
The history of the 1954 legislation reveals that the Congress,
in thinking of the public's health and safety, had in mind . . .
the special hazards of radioactivity.... "The special problem of
safety in the atomic field is the consequence of the hazards, created
by potentially harmful radiations attendant upon atomic energy
operations."
New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 174 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 895
U.S. 962 (1969).
The court then concluded that
in enacting the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, in overseeing
its administration, and in considering amendments, the Congress
has viewed the responsibility of the Commission as being confined
to scrutiny of the protection against hazards from radiation.
Id. at 175.
Further, the Atomic Energy Commission's own statements as to
the definition of "safety," a definition that is entitled to "great deference" and is clearly reasonable, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965), include environmental damage as one consideration.
A nudear device can be detonated safely when it is ascertained
that the detonation can be accomplished... without unacceptable
damage to the ecological system and natural and man-made structures.
Defendants' exhibit, Effects Evaluation for Project Rulison, Foreword,
June 1969.
The Commission takes every reasonable precaution to insure
that the tests ... cause no material damage ... to the ecology ....
Defendants' exhibit, Safety to Underground Nuclear Testing 1, April
1969.
Plaintiff also has an interest in preventing pollution of the air
and water. The Atomic Energy Commission is subject to the Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466(h) (Supp. IV, 1969), relating

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:761

to water pollution by federal agencies; to the Air Quality Control Act
of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(b), 1857f(a) (Supp. IV, 1969); and to Exec.
Order No. 11,282, 3 C.F.R. § 419 (1969), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (Supp. IV,
1969), relating to air pollution by federal agencies. Cf. New Hampshire
v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175-76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962
(1969).
POINT 3
The scope of review of agency action is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 706

(Supp. IV, 1969):
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory rights;
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
The "hospitable interpretation" of the Administrative Procedure
Act required by Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967),
"applies not only where a specific statute is claimed to preclude
judicial review, but also where it is invoked as delimiting the scope
of judicial review." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Brenner, 383 F.2d 514,
517-18 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968).
The mere fact that the acts of the Secretary ...required the exercise
of discretion and judgment on his part, does not preclude judicial
review of his action. To be sure, if upon such review it appears
that his action was within the scope of the authority conferred
upon him, the court cannot disturb his decision. But that is a different rule from the rule of total non-reviewability. The Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) forbids judicial review only
where statutes "preclude" such review or where agency action
is "by law committed to agency discretion." . . . [T]he Secretary
would have us stretch the second prohibitory clause far beyond its
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meaning. He says that there can be no review where agency action
"involves" discretion or judgment. Obviously the statute does not
mean that; almost every agency action "involves" an element of
discretion or judgment.
Homovich v. Chapman, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (footnote
omitted).
[A]ction by an administrative agency, although a matter of discretion to considerable extent, is not wholly immune from judicial
examination and.., is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act for abuse of discretion ....
Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp.
433, 442 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act clearly
reveals that Congress intended that this court follow the holdings of
Homovich and Western Addition Community Organization:
A proper regard for the whole reach of the Administrative Procedure Act and its long legislative history will not support an argument which would automatically remove from its protection substantially every administrative agency to whom was entrusted
judgment and discretion in its administrative decision. This language was used to assure that judicial review would not be contrived
where it was plain that none was intended, and where the action
under inquiry was one wholly within the right of the agency to
grant or refuse, allow or deny, with no statutory or similar standard
established upon which to base its action. But the exercise of discretion, the making of judgments, and the issuance of sanctions,

5 U.S.C.A. § 1001(f), upon the basis of administrative expertise
are precisely the matters which Congress in this important legislation intended should be under, not exempt from, the Administrative Procedure Act.
Amarillo-Borger Express v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 411, 418
(N.D. Tex. 1956), vacated as moot, 352 U.S. 1028 (1957). See also
Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385 F.2d 308, 316-17 n.14 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
The following references to the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act are found on the pages indicated in ADMINISmRATIVE

PRocEDuRE Acr,

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc.]:
R
Iw-Section 10 on judicial review does not
apply in any situation so far as there are involved matters with
respect to which statutes preclude judicial review or agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion.
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never
SEC. 10. JUDICIAL
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been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its
own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority
granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be
otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank
checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.
The basic exception of matters committed to agency discretion
would apply even if not stated at the outset. If, for example, statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law
to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to review.
That situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure
act but must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administrative powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions
or other grants of power deny or require action in given situations
or confine an agency within limits as required by the Constitution,
then the determination of the facts does not lie in agency discretion
but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial
record.
REPORT OF THE COMMITrE: ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 752, 79th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), in S. Doc. 212 (emphasis in original).
This section [10] requires adequate, fair, effective, complete,
and just determination of the rights of any person in properly
invoked proceedings.
... The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they
relate to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To
preclude judicial review... a statute, if not specific in withholding
such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence
of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially
by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to
withhold review.
Matters of discretion are necessarily exempted from the section,
since otherwise courts would in effect supersede agency functioning.
But that does not mean that questions of law properly presented
are withdrawn from reviewing courts. Where laws are so broadly
drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situation cannot be
remedied by an administrative procedure act but must be treated
by the revision of statutes conferring administrative powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions, or other grants of power
deny or require action in given situations or confine an agency
within limits as required by the Constitution, then the determination of the facts does not lie in agency discretion but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial record. In any case
the existence of discretion does not prevent a person from bringing
a review action but merely prevents him pro tanto from prevailing
therein.
HousE COMMrrrE ON THE JUDicIRY, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1946), in S. Doc. 275.
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The following exchange took place in the Senate during presentation of the bill by its sponsor Senator McCarran:
Mr. DONNELL. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator
a question. § 10 of the bill recites in part that"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion(a) Right of review: Any person suffering legal wrong because
of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof."
It has occurred to me the contention might be made by someone in undertaking to analyze this measure that in any case in
which discretion is committed to an agency, there can be no judicial
review of action taken by the agency. The point to which I request
the Senator to direct his attention is this: In a case in which a
person interested asserts that, although the agency does not have a
discretion vested in it by law, nevertheless there has been abuse of
that discretion, is there any intention on the part of the framers
of this bill to preclude a person who claims abuse of discretion from
the iight to have judicial review of the action as taken by the
agency?
Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, let me say, in answer to the
able Senator that the thought uppermost in presenting this bill is
that where an agency without authority or by caprice makes a
decision, then it is subject to review.
Mr. DONNELL. But the mere fact that a statute may vest discretion in any agency is not intended, by this bill, to preclude a
party in interest from having a review in the event he claims there
has been an abuse of that discretion. Is that correct?
Mr. McCARRAN. It must not be an arbitrary discretion. It
must be a judicial discretion; it must be a discretion based on
sound reasoning.
S. Doc. 310-11.
A federal court has A dear duty and constitutional obligation to
review and set aside agency action that exceeds the agency's statutory
authority.
The authority of an administrative agency is delineated by
terms of the statutory grant. The responsibility for construing the
statutory authority rests with the judiciary. Hence, an inquiry to
determine if the agency has exceeded its statutory power is a constitutional obligation of the courts.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Benj. Harris & Co., 245 F. Supp. 467, 472 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
This court has the duty to hold unlawful and set aside agency
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action, findings and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 301, 305 (D.N.D.
1967).
The Administrative Procedure Act did not confer any powers of
immunity upon federal agencies; rather, the purpose of the Act was
to strictly confine the agency's actions:
Senator McCarran, the author of the bill which became the
Administrative Procedure Act, on the floor of the Senate explained
that the bill conferred no administrative powers, but provided
definitions of, and limitations upon, administrative action, to be
interpreted and applied by the agencies in the first instance, but
to be enforced by the courts in the final analysis.
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 863 (4th Cir. 1961).
In reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, there is no
aura of sanctity surrounding the agency's action simply because that
agency's action involves expertise:
While it is true that courts, as a gen[e]ral rule, pay great deference
to administrative decisions they do so only for certain compelling
reasons.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358
F.2d 574, 586 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966).
The weight given a decision of an administrative agency "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift &Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 ... (1944) (Jackson, J.).

Id. at 586 n.lI.
The [Interstate Commerce] Commission is the expert in the
field of transportation. And its judgment is entitled to great deference because of its familiarity with the conditions in the industry
which it regulates. .

.

. But Congress has placed limits on its

statutory powers; and our duty on judicial review is to determine
those limits.
East Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S.
49, 54 (1956).
The administrative agency, in order to properly exercise its statutory authority and powers, particularly where the health and safety
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of the public is at stake, has an affirmative duty to protect the public
interest in the best manner possible:
[T]he right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.
...The Commission has an affirmative duty to inquire into
and consider all relevant facts.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
[T]he duty imposed upon the [Federal Power] Commission
...

is... to give proper consideration to logical alternatives which

might serve the public interest better than any of the projects outlined in the applications.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(emphasis in original).
The test is whether the project will be in the public interest.
And that determination can be made only after an exploration of
all issues relevant to the "public interest" ....

Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428,450 (1967).
[T]he Secretary must base his decisions on a complete record expressing the views of all recognized interests ....

Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 832
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
Administrative action must be judged on the ground on which
the record discloses that the action was based, and, where the decision
of the administrative agency is explicitly based upon the applicability
of certain principles, its validity must likewise be judged on that basis.
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1947).
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court
is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what
it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis....
...

If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis

upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with
such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court
to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's
action ....
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947).
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[P]resumptions declared by administrative agencies are not
binding on the courts.
Porter v. Fleishman, 71 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Ore. 1947).
[Fjindings of an administrative body are not binding upon ...
this Court ....

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 128 F.
Supp. 475, 504 (D. Ore. 1953).
It is only when a statute requires, that a court must accept findings
of fact of an administrative body.

Id. at 505 n.58.
Courts ought not to have to speculate as to the basis for an
administrative agency's conclusion.
Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 1964).
See also National Trailer Convoy, Inc v. United States, 293 F. Supp.
634, 637 (N.D. Okla. 1968); Saginaw Tranfer Co. v. United States, 275
F. Supp. 585, 588 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Pre-Fab Transit Co. v. United
States, 262 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
Though a court should not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency, it can compel the proper exercise of statutory authority
by the agency: "'[I]f we cannot guarantee the 'right' decisions, we can
perhaps insure that more decisions are made by the right processes.'"
Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 832
(E.D. Pa. 1968), quoting Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75
YALE L. J. 1227, 1251 (1966).
POINT 4
The doctrine of sovereign immunity may no longer be raised by
a federal administrative agency, even in the absence of a statute
waiving such alleged immunity.
The general doctrine of the immunity of the United States from
suit without consent of Congress is a rule conceived by the federal
judiciary. There is no basis for this rule either in the Constitution
itself or in any specific statute of Congress, but rather sovereign immunity is a rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
Apparently the first assertion of the sovereign immunity of the
federal government was the following dictum by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821):
"The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced
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or prosecuted against the United States; that the Judiciary Act does not
authorize such suits."
Cohens v. Virginia had been preceded by Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), dealing with the immunity of a state
from suit by a citizen of another state, in which several opinions traced
the development of sovereign immunity in England. Although the
eleventh amendment speedily overruled the holding in Chisholm, it
was not before a thorough discussion of sovereignty. Justice Wilson
specifically stated that the term "sovereign" was "unknown" to the Constitution of the United States:
[r]he term sovereign has for its correlative, subject. In this sense,
the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the
Constitution of the United States. Under that Constitution there
are citizens, but no subjects...
*.. [T]he people ... of the United States... have reserved
the Supreme Power in their own hands; and on that Supreme
Power, have made the [government] dependent, instead of being
sovereign ....
Id. at 456-57 (emphasis in original).
Justice Wilson also traced the establishment of despotic governments to the doctrine of sovereignty:
Even in almost every nation, which has been denominated free,
the state has assumed a supercilious pre-eminence above the people,
who have formed it: Hence the haughty notions of state independence, state sovereignty and state supremacy. In despotic Governments, the Government has usurped, in a similar manner, both
upon the state and the people: Hence all arbitrary doctrines and
pretensions concerning the Supreme, absolute, and incontrolable
[sic], power of Government. In each, man is degraded from the
prime rank, which he ought to hold in human affairs ....
Id. at 461 (emphasis in original).
Justice Wilson also indicated that in England the sovereignty had
been described as being in Parliament, with the people ignored;
to Wilson this was a description of a despotic government:
Another instance, equally strong, but still more astonishing, is
drawn from the British Government, as described by Sir William
Blackstone and his followers. As described by him and them, the
British is a despotic Government. It is a Government without a
people. In that Government, as so described, the sovereignty is
possessed by the Parliament: In the Parliament, therefore, the
supreme and absolute authority is vested: In the Parliament resides
that incontrollable and despotic power, which, in all Governments,
must reside somewhere. The constituent parts of the Parliament are
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the King's Majesty, the Lord's Spiritual, the Lord's Temporal,
and the Commons. The King and these three Estates together form
the great corporation or body politic of the Kingdom. All these
sentiments are found; the last expressions are found verbatim in
the commentaries upon the laws of England. The Parliamentform
the great body politic of England! What, then, or where, are the
PEoPLE? Nothingl No wherel They are not so much as even the
"baseless fabric of a visionl" From legal contemplation they totally
disappearl Am I not warranted in saying, that, if this is a just
description; a Government, so and justly so described, is a despotic
Government?
Id. at 462 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Jay also recognized the people of the United States,
not the federal government, as the sovereign:
From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country
[T]he people, in their collective
passed to the people of it ....
and national capacity, established the present Constitution. It is
remarkable that in establishing it, the people exercised their own
rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and conscious of the
plentitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, "We the
people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution." Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole
country ....
. .. [T]he sovereignty of the nation is [in] the people of the
nation . ...
Id. at 470-71 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Jay noted that in England the doctrine of sovereignty
was based on feudal principles that considered the prince as sovereign
and the people as his subjects. These feudal principles contemplated
the sovereign
as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace
and grant derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; it is
easy to perceive that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a
Court of Justice, or subjected to judicial controul and actual constraint. It was of necessity, therefore, that suability, became incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides, the Prince having all
the Executive powers, the judgment of the Courts would, in fact,
be only monitory, not mandatory to him, and a capacity to be
advised, is a distinct thing from a capacity to be sued. The same
feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly
remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject.
No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but they are sovereigns without subjects... and have none
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to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as
fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.
• . . Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or Statesovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe
the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it resides
with the people .... Their Princeshave personal powers, dignities,
and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor do they
partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than
as private citizens.
Id. at 471-72 (emphasis in original).
Jay left as a question whether the United States could be sued
by an individual citizen if there was a controversy between them. Id.
at 478. He stated that, since section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
extended the judicial power to controversies to which the United States
was a party, then an argument "that the United States may be sued
by any citizen between whom and them there may be a controversy ...
appears to me to be fair reasoning... ." Id. Jay was worried, however,
that in actions against the United States, the executive power of the
federal government could not be called to support the court's proceedings and judgments. Because Jay was not assured that "the State
of society was so far improved, and the science of Government advanced
to such a degree of perfection, as that the whole nation could in the
peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by
individual citizens," and because the issue was collateral and incidental
to the case, Jay formally, though not impliedly, left the question unanswered. Id.
It is clear, however, that the majority of the court, just five years
after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, rejected
the idea of the United States as sovereign-and necessarily the rule
of sovereign immunity from suit-because "suability became incompatible with such sovereignty." Id. at 471. The people were the sorereign, not the United States government.
However, after the adoption of the principle that the United
States could not be sued without its consent in Cohens v. Virginia,
reiterated in United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834),
the Supreme Court stated that- this principle was drawn from the
common law doctrine of the sovereign as immune from suit. In The
Siren, the Court, however, rested the doctrine on grounds of newly
invented public policy considerations:
It is a familar doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign
cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. The doctrine
rests upon reasons of public policy; the inconvenience and danger
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which would follow from any different rule. It is obvious that the
public service would be hindered, and the public safety endangered,
if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance
of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government. The exemption from direct suit, is therefore, without
exception. This doctrine of the common law is equally applicable
to the supreme authority of the nation, the United States. They
cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their consent; and whoever institutes such proceedings must
bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress.
The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868).
In 1882 the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the reasons underlying the judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity:
In order to decide whether the inference is justified from what
is conceded, it is necessary to ascertain, if we can, on what prindple the exemption of the United States from a suit by one of its
citizens is founded, and what limitations surround this exemption.
In this, as in most other cases of like character, it will be found
that the doctrine is derived from the laws and practices of our
English ancestors; and while it is beyond question that from the
time of Edward the First until now the King of England was not
suable in the courts of that country, except where his consent had
been given on petition of right, it is a matter of great uncertainty
whether prior to that time he was not suable in his own courts and
in his kingly character as other persons were. We have the authority
of Chief Baron Comyns, 1 Digest, 132, Action, C. 1, and 6 Digest, 67,
Prerogative; and of the Mirror of Justices, chap. 1, sect. 3 and chap.
5, sect. 1, that such was the law; and of Bracton and Lord Holt, that
the King never was suable of common right. It is certain, however,
that after the establishment of the petition of right about that time
as the appropriate manner of seeking relief where the ascertainment
of the parties' rights required a suit against the King, no attempt
has been made to sue the King in any court except as allowed on
such petition.
It is believed that this petition of right, as it has been practiced and observed in the administration of justice in England,
has been as efficient in securing the rights of suitors against the
crown in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which
the law affords to the subjects of the King in legal controversies
among themselves. "If the mode of proceeding to enforce it be formal and ceremonious, it is nevertheless a practical and efficient
remedy for the invasion by the sovereign power of individual
rights." United States v. O'Keefe, 11 Wall. 178.
There is in this country, however, no such thing as the petition
of right, as there is no such thing as a kingly head to the nation,

PROJECT RULISON BRIEF
or to any of the States which compose it. There is vested in no
officer or body the authority to consent that the State shall be sued
except in the law-making power, which may give such consent on
the terms it may choose to impose. The Davis, 10 Wall. 15.
Congress has created a court in which it has authorized suits to
be brought against the United States, but has limited such suits
to those arising on contract, with a few unimportant exceptions.
What were the reasons which forbid that the King should be
sued in his own court, and how do they apply to the political body
corporate which we call the United States of America? As regards
the King, one reason given by the old judges was the absurdity
of the King's sending a writ to himself to command the King to
appear in the King's court. No such reason exists in our government, as process runs in the name of the President, and may be
served on the Attorney-General as was done in Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 Dall. 419. Nor can it be said that the government is degraded by
appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because
it is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting
its rights as against the citizen to their judgment.
Mr. Justice Gray, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
an able and learned opinion which exhausts the sources of information on this subject, says: "The broader reason is, that it would be
inconsistent with the very idea of supreme executive power, and
would endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a matter of right, at the
will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the control and disposition of his public property, his instruments and
means of carrying on his government in war and in peace, and
the money in his treasury." Briggs & Another v. Light Boats, 11
Allen (Mass.), 157. As no person in this government exercises
supreme executive power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle
the exemption from liability to suit rests. It seems most probable
that it has been adopted in our courts as a part of the general
doctrine of publicists, that the supreme power in every State, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of
its own creation, to defend itself from assaults in those courts.
It is obvious that in our system of jurisprudence the principle
is as applicable to each of the States as it is to the United States,
except in those cases where by the Constitution a State of the Union
may be sued in this court. RailroadCompany v. Tennessee, 101 U.S.
337; Railroad Company v. Alabama, id. 832.
That the doctrine met with a doubtful reception in the early
history of this court may be seen from the opinions of two of its
justices in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, where Mr. Justice
Wilson, a member of the convention which framed the Constitution, after a learned examination of the laws of England and other
states and kingdoms, sums up the result by saying: "We see nothing
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against, but much in favor of, the jurisdiction of this court over
the State of Georgia, a party to this cause." Mr. Chief Justice Jay
also considered the question as affected by the difference between
a republican State like ours and a personal sovereign, and held
that there is no reason why a state should not be sued, though
doubting whether the United States would be subject to the same
rule.
The first recognition of the general doctrine by this court
is to be found in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.
The terms in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall there gives
assent to the principle does not add much to its force. "The counsel for the defendant," he says, "has laid down the general proposition that a sovereign independent State is not suable except by its
own consent." This general proposition, he adds, will not be controverted.
And while the exemption of the United States and of the
several States from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted
here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it
given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.
United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; United States v. McLemore,
4 How. 286; Hill v. United States, 9 id. 386; Nations v. Johnson,
24 id. 195; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; The Davis, 10 id. 15.
On the other hand, while acceding to the general proposition
that in no court can the United States be sued directly by original
process as a defendant, there is abundant evidence in the decisions
of this court that the doctrine, if not absolutely limited to cases
in which the United States are made defendants by name, is not
permitted to interfere with the judicial enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs when the United States is not a defendant
or a necessary party to the suit.
But little weight can be given to the decisions of the English
courts on this branch of the subject, for two reasons:1. In all cases where the title to property came into controversy
between the crown and a subject, whether held in right of the
person who was king or as representative of the nation, the petition of right presented a judicial remedy,-a remedy which this
court, on full examination in a case which required it, held to be
practical and efficient. There has been, therefore, no necessity for
suing the officers or servants of the King who held possession of such
property, when the issue could be made with the King himself as
defendant.
2. Another reason of much greater weight is found in the vast
difference in the essential character of the two governments as
regards the source and the depositaries of power.
Notwithstanding the progress which has been made since the
days of the Stuarts in stripping the crown of its powers and prerogatives; it remains true to-day that the monarch is looked upon
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with too much reverence to be subjected to the demands of the
law as ordinary persons are, and the king-loving nation would be
shocked at the spectacle of their Queen being turned out of her
pleasure-garden by a writ of ejectment against the gardener. The
crown remains the fountain of honor, and the surroundings which
give dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished and enforced
all the more strictly because of the loss of real power in the government.
It is not to be expected, therefore, that the courts will permit
their process to disturb the possession of the crown by acting on
its officers or agents.
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects,
are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or individual,
are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person
of a monarch. The citizen here knows no person, however near
to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need
yield the rights which the law secures to him when it is well administered. When he, in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction,
has established his right to property, there is no reason why
deference to any person, natural or artificial, not even the United
States, should prevent him from using the means which the law
gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-09 (1882).
Thus the Supreme Court in Lee rejected the policy grounds upon
which the court had based the sovereign immunity doctrine in The
Siren and in fact did not apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Nevertheless the doctrine of sovereign immunity lives on, often justified by the reasons rejected in Lee. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
The Supreme Court had rejected, prior to Lee, the contention
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity could rest on the maxim of
English law that the King could do no wrong:
It is not easy to see how the . .. proposition can have any
place in our system of government.
We have no king to whom it can be applied. The President,
in the exercise of the executive functions, bears a nearer resemblance to the limited monarch of the English government than
any other branch of our government, and is the only individual
to whom it could possibly have any relation. It cannot apply to
him, because the Constitution admits that he may do wrong, and
has provided, by the proceeding of impeachment, for his trial for
wrong-doing, and his removal from office if found guilty. None of
the eminent counsel who defended President Johnson on his impeachment trial asserted that by law he was incapable of doing
wrong, or that, if done, it could not, as in the case of the king,
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be imputed to him, but must be laid to the charge of the ministers
who advised him.
It is to be observed that the English maxim does not declare
that the government, or those who administer it, can do no wrong;
for it is a part of the principle itself that wrong may be done by
the governing power, for which the ministry, for the time being,
is held responsible; and the ministers personally, like our President,
may be impeached; or, if the wrong amounts to a crime, they may
be indicted and tried at law for the offense.
We do not understand that either in reference to the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of
their officers, the English maxim has an existence in this country.
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).
There is some evidence that the original meaning of the presixteenth century maxim-that the king can do no wrong-was
merely that the king was not privileged to do wrong. (Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 2; Ehrlich,
Proceedings Against the Crown, (1216-1377) at pp. 42, 127 [Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. VI (1921)].)
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214 n.1, 359 P.2d 457,
458 n.1, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 n.1 (1961).
Yet the Supreme Court later held that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was based on the grounds that "the authority that makes
the law is itself superior to it" (The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432
(1922)), and that "there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends" (Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)). These opinions, written by
Justice Holmes, have been roundly criticized for logical inconsistency
and for reliance on English authorities.
The period of restriction of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
evidenced by Lee was not to last, as the Holmes opinion in Kawananakoa and The Western Maid have resulted in the strictest doctrine of
sovereign immunity to date. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, originally justified by the
Supreme Court as an inherited concept from the English common law,
is now justified solely on the grounds of policy.
The reasons for this immunity are imbedded in our legal philosophy. They partake somewhat of dignity and decorum, somewhat
of practical administration, somewhat of the political desirability
of an impregnable legal citadel where government as distinct from
its functionaries may operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants.
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United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940).
The principle of immunity from litigation assures the . . .
nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government ....
The history of sovereign immunity and the practical
necessity of unfettered freedom for government from crippling
interferences require a restriction of suability to the terms of the
consent ....
Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1944).
The Supreme Court in 1950 in effect overturned Holmes's rationale, holding that
While the political theory that the King could do no wrong was
repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the
Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented was
invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied by our courts as
vigorously as it had been on behalf of the Crown.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
The principle of Chisholm v. Georgia and United States v. Leethat the people are the sovereign-has never been repudiated. The
Supreme Court has instead created a legal fiction in the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that the United
States cannot be sued without the consent of Congress, and at the
time of United States v. Lee the Supreme Court looked only to the
named party defendant in determining whether the United States
was being sued, today "[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally
against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would
operate against the latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
The decree is considered to operate against the United States if
the relief sought would require the expenditure of public funds,
or entail the tranfer of lands held in the public domain, or if it would
restrain the government from acting or require it to act. Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply where the
officer or agent of the United States is acting beyond his statutory
powers or, though acting within the scope of his statutory authority,
the powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are
constitutionally void. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963).
Where such actions are alleged, "the United States is not an indispensable party where, although the officer acts under a valid statute,
he actually exceeded the authority with which the statute invested
him." Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. Cal'. 1949).
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See also Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250, 254 (1925). "[The] exemption
of the United States from suit does not protect its officers acting without
or in excess of their authority." Garvey v. Freeman, 263 F. Supp. 573,
577 (D. Colo. 1967).
A suit to enjoin acts of an officer of the United States exceeding
his statutory authority is not a suit against the United States nor a
suit to interfere with property of the United States. Magruder v. Belle
Fourche Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 219 F. 72, 78 (8th Cir. 1914).
[W]here the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign
actions.... His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore
may be made the object of specific relief.
Larson v. Domestic &eForeign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689
(1949).
Sovereign immunity does not prevent a suit against a federal
officer who is acting in excess of his authority... Since the decision
the traditional remedy
in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 ....
of a person aggrieved by governmental action . . . has been a

suit against the government officer responsible for that action and
such suits have been permitted when the officers have exceeded
their statutory powers.
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 651-52 (10th
Cir. 1960).
As to actions beyond the statutory limitation, such actions of the
officer are considered individual, not sovereign, on the theory that
the actions are ultra vires and, therefore, specific relief may be obtained.
Doehla Greeting Cards v. Summerfield, 227 F.2d 44, 46 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect
its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.... And in case of an injury
threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot claim immunity
from injunction process....
...

The suit rests upon the charge of abuse of power, and its

merits must be determined accordingly; it is not a suit against
the United States.
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912).
The United States Government "does not become the conduit of
its immunity in suits against its agents or instrumentalities merely
because they do its work." Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 388
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(1939). It does not matter "that the agent is a corporation rather than
a single man." Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258
U.S. 549, 567 (1922).
Determination of the court's jurisdiction is dependent upon the
exceeding of statutory or constitutional authority by the officers and
agency of the government herein involved. Such determination can be
made only upon a full determination of the merits:
Where a plaintiff asserts in his complaint that an officer of the
Government is acting without power and that therefore his acts
are invalid, the court, in determining the preliminary jurisdictional
question whether or not the United States is a necessary party, is
confronted with a problem arising out of the fact that the determination of that question involves passing upon the very question
involved in the merits....

The courts solve this problem by accepting at their face value,
for jurisdictional purpose, the assertions of the complainant of want
of power in the officer . . . and by giving the assertions thus accepted their natural jurisdictional consequences in respect of who
are necessary parties.
West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 592-93 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
[I]f it appears from the allegations of the complaint, excluding conclusions of law and unwarranted inferences of fact, that the officer
named as defendant is acting beyond his delegated power or if
the authority purporting to confer power on him to act is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid then the action will lie. The officer
is not then validly performing the will of his sovereign.
Ogden River Water Users Ass'n v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy,
238 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1956).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit, a fiction created by
the federal judiciary, is today based upon the desirability of leaving
the government-the sovereign-unfettered from accomplishing its
business. But the people are the sovereign under the Constitution of
the United States; the officers of the government "are the agents of
the people." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793).
"The government of the Union... is emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them.
Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them, and for their benefit." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).
The decision in The Siren, supporting the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, clearly indicates that the reason to leave the*federal govern-
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ment unfettered in accomplishing its business is because "the public
service would be hindered and. the public safety endangered." 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) at 154.
Where the plaintiff is asserting the "public service" and "public
safety" in a suit against an agency and officers of the government, he is
in effect asserting the rights of the true sovereign-the people. To
apply the doctine of sovereign immunity in such a situation is to apply
a rule without reason-in fact to apply the rule contrary to the reasons
that underlie it. To apply the judicially conceived doctrine of sovereign
immunity would be a perversion of justice, not to say illogical.
As Cardozo said: "[W]hen a rule, after it has been duly tested
by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of
justice or . . the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in
frank avowal and full abandonment." B. CARnozo, THE NATUE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921). And in the words of Chief Justice
Warren Burger: "'If it doesn't make good sense, how can it make
good law?"' Duscha, Chief Justice Burger Asks: "If It Doesn't Make
Good Sense, How Can It Make Good Law?," N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1969,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 140.
Numerous courts, including the Supreme Court, have expressed
opposition to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but the fiction of
the doctrine is reaffirmed and occasionally strengthened.
[I]t is a mere rule of convenience in a jurisprudence revolving
about a democratic constitutional form of government. It has a
valuable place of public importance in that jurisprudence. But
it should not be permitted to thwart fundamental principles of
greater importance.
Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1951), vacated as moot,
344 U.S. 806 (1952).
The adherents of sovereign immunity urge that the courts should
allow any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity to come only
from the Congress. They further urge that the courts should not act
to abolish sovereign immunity in a certain area because Congress has
passed legislation waiving sovereign immunity in certain areas.
It has been urged by the adherents of the sovereign immunity
rule that the principle has become so firmly fixed that any change
must come from the legislature. In previous decisions . . . this

court concurred in this reasoning. Upon reconsideration we realize
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity-was originally judicially
created. W¥e are now convinced that a court-made rule, when unjust
or outmoded, does not necessarily become with age invulnerable
to judicial attack.
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Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 393, 381 P.2d
107, 113 (1963); see Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132
(Fla. 1957); Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 284, 111 N.W.2d 1,
16-17 (1961) (concurring opinion); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.
2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (1962); cf. National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
Defendant would have us say that because the Legislature has
removed governmental immunity in these areas we are powerless to
remove it in others. We read the statutes as meaning only what
they say: that in the areas indicated there shall be no governmental
immunity. They leave to the court whether it should adhere to
its own rule of immunity in other areas.
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218-19, 359 P.2d 457,
461, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1961).
By abolishing the rule of sovereign immunity, if only in suits
where plaintiff asserts the public interest, rather than a right particular
to himself, the court need not worry about opening the doors of the
federal courts to a deluge and flood of suits. The rules on availability
and scope of review operate satisfactorily to prevent the courts from
going too far into the administration of the agencies. Davis, Sovereign
Immunity in Suits against Officers for Relief other than Damages, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 3, 4 (1954). The rules as to case or controversy,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and other jurisdictional requirements, as well as the cost of litigation, will similarly prevent a
deluge of law suits if the doctrine of sovereign immunity is so limited.
Block, Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine,59 H~Av. L. REv. 1060, 1081 (1946).
The judicial creation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an
unconstitutional limitation of the judicial power in violation of Article III, sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
Unlike the rules as to standing and cases or controversies, which the
federal courts can limit and define according to Article III, section 2,
there is no source in the Constitution by which the federal courts can
impose the doctrine of sovereign immunity. To the extent that the
doctrine is based on the United States Government as sovereign, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity violates the constitutional interpretation of the people as sovereign as stated by Justice Wilson and Chief
Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). • ,
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is also an unconstitutional
infringement on the standing of individual citizens, under the ninth
and tenth amendments of the United States Constitution, to contest
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the validity of governmental activities. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dali.) 419, 470 (1793); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
103 F. Supp. 569, 573 n.3 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
POINT 5
In those actions where the right of judicial review is available
under the Administrative Procedure Act, sovereign immunity is waived.
This express authorization of judicial review in this case [under
the Administrative Procedure Act] disposes of the argument that
the suit is in substance one against the United States where the
United States has not given its consent to be sued. The United
States has consented to this review. The fact that the United States
has some interest in the controversy does not provide an exception
to the grant of a right of review.
Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34 (9th Cir. 1958).
We are of the opinion that the reasons given by the trial court
for lack of jurisdiction are not sound. Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1009
[presently codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1969)] expressly
provides for review of administrative or agency action at the instance of "any person suffering legal wrong" because of such action
"or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action" subject to certain exceptions stated in that section. Instead of reaching a conclusion that the action was "in effect one brought against the
United States without its consent," the court should have made
inquiry whether the action was one authorized by the section referred to above. If so, the necessary consent of the United States
will be found to exist.
Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544,547 (9th Cir. 1966).
In Brennan v. Udall, 251 F. Supp. 12 (D. Colo. 1966), the appellant
owned 160 acres of land which was in 1917 patented to one Baxter,
reserving to the United States "all the nitrate, oil, and gas in the
lands," as required by 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-23 (1964). Brennan and Humble
Oil Company, holder of an option to purchase the land, petitioned the
Director of Land Management for a decision that oil shale was not
included in the patent. The Director, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, held that oil shale was included in the patent.
Appellant filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior, challenging his
decision. Jurisdiction was alleged under the Administrative Procedure
Act. The-District Court (Doyle, J.) held:
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Mhe Administrative Procedure Act authorizes bringing of the suit

and the granting of the relief demanded ....
The defendant maintains that this suit is one that seeks to quiet
title and as such is an unconsented suit against the sovereign ....
Gases relied on by defendant in support of his position that
this Court lacks jurisdiction do not involve the issue of excess of
administrative authority, but rather concern only challenges to the
correctness of a decision committed by law to administrative discretion.
251 F. Supp. at 14.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed:
At the outset, the Secretary [of the Interior] challenges the
jurisdiction of the court because the relief sought seeks to diminish
the title of the United States in the lands, consequently it is a
necessary party and has not consented to be sued. We agree with
the trial court that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior adversely affects Brennan's title to the land in question and is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 1009,
(now §§ 701-706).
Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1967).
A position that the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be interjected, even where the right of judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act is authorized, would clearly be inconsistent with Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 887 U.S. 136 (1967), where the Supreme Court
of the United States held that only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intention should the courts
restrict access to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
For it must be remembered that Congress intended to extend the
scope of judicial review through passage of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Contemporary discussion and debate clearly demonstrate that one
of the main objectives of the Administrative Procedure Act was to
extend the right of judicial review. One of its purposes was to enlarge the authority of the courts to check illegal and arbitrary
administrative action. The courts stand between the citizens and
administrative officers. .

.

. [The Administrative Procedure Act]

broadened the scope of judicial review and it enlarged the class of
persons who were given standing to invoke the judicial process.
American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346,
849 (D.D.C. 1953).
The purpose of section 1009 has been stated to be to extend
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the right of judicial review and to enlarge the authority of courts
to check illegal and arbitrary administrative action.
DiCostanzo v. Willard, 165 F. Supp. 533, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
[The] purpose [of the Administrative Procedure Act] was to
remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes ....
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
CONCLUSION 5
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand judgement of the defendants:
DECLARING
The rights of the people of the State of Colorado to the protection
of their personal health and safety and the health and safety of those
generations yet unborn from the hazards of ionizing radiation resulting
from the distribution of radioactive materials through the Colorado
Regional Ecosystem as a result of Project Rulison.
The rights of the people of the State of Colorado to the full benefit,
use, and enjoyment of the national natural resource treasures of the
State of Colorado without degradation resulting from contamination
with radioactive material released by Project Rulison.
The rights of the people of the State of Colorado to a full disclosure by the defendants of the facts, if any, supporting the claims that:
Safety of the public is a prime consideration of all Project
Rulison participants. All factors that affect safety will be investigated thoroughly, reviewed by a panel of safety consultants, and
evaluated on the basis of the knowledge gained from the extensive
experience of previous nuclear detonations.
AEC experience with more than 270 underground nuclear
detonations indicates that escape of radioactivity into the atmosphere is highly unlikely to result from Project Rulison.
Ground motion has been carefully calculated and no significant damage is predicted.
Ground waters in the Rulison site area have been evaluated
by numerous engineers and scientists, who are convinced that
there will be no contamination of the ground water.
Extensive operational safety measures have been undertaken
to protect the public.
5 The Conclusion is taken from the COSC complaint in the Project Rulison case.
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RESTRAINING
the defendants, jointly, or severally, individually or in concert with
others from any act which will result in the contamination of the
permanent biological, geological, and chemical cycles of the Biosphere
with radioactive material or the release of any ionizing radiation into
the environment.
RESTRAINING
the defendants from proceeding with the detonation of any nuclear
bomb in the State of Colorado, until such time as the defendants have
shown good cause supported by substantial evidence that such detonation of a nuclear bomb will not cause contamination of the permanent
biogeochemical cycles of the Biosphere with radioactive materials, and
that such detonation of a nuclear bomb will not release any ionizing
radiation into the environment.
TOGETHER
with such other and further relief shall seem just and proper to the
Court under the circumstances.

